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Summary
Between 1986 and 1997 the European Community provided 830,2 Mio ECU in its aid programme
to South Africa. Initially, and notably from 1986 to 1991, the programme funded projects to assist
the victims of apartheid and was carried out in the face of active opposition from the South African
authorities. It succeeded, nonetheless, in making a positive contribution to peace and democracy. As
the political situation in South Africa evolved, the programme continued to support democracy and
human rights, and started to promote social and economic development. In 1994 the democratic
government was established, the Commission Delegation was opened in Pretoria and a cooperation
agreement between South Africa and the Community was signed. The European Programme for
Reconstruction and Development (1994-99) was started.
This report examines how the programme was implemented and managed by the Commission and
other organisations involved. It focuses mainly on the period 1993-97.
Many of the key findings in this report concern weaknesses on which the Court has previously
commented in other reports on development cooperation programmes. They are, therefore, of
general relevance, and the Commission should, without delay, take steps to overcome them.
As in other parts of the world, the implementation of the programme has been adversely affected by
there being too many layers of decision making and administration, with too many matters having to
come up to Commission headquarters in Brussels for final decision. This was one of the main causes
of delays and deficiencies in project implementation and monitoring. In particular during the first
phases of the European Community and South African cooperation, it was found that projects were
often poorly formulated, timetables were unrealistic, and some conditions in contracts and financial
agreements were inappropriate. Treasury management by the Commission was poor. Reporting
procedures were inadequate, and monitoring by the Commission was weak. Apart from the global
evaluation of the European Special Programme carried out in 1996, there was insufficient evaluation
of the effectiveness of the actions financed through non-governmental channels.
The Commission underestimated the institutional strengthening that was needed by its South African
partners to enable them to implement the programme more effectively and efficiently. When the
Commission began the programme with the new government in 1994, like other donors it was
unrealistic about the volume of funds that could be efficiently and effectively absorbed in the short
term by the South African administration. It would also have been preferable to concentrate
resources on fewer sectors initially.
The European Programme for Reconstruction and Development is delayed in its implementation, and
disbursements are much lower than planned. The Bursary Programme 1993-95, which was one of
the main Community actions, was less effective than it could have been because of poor management
and monitoring. A backlog of more than 750 completed or inactive contracts going back to 1986
have not been properly closed by the Commission.
Throughout the period the resources allocated by the Commission for the management of the
programme, and their organisation, were inadequate. There was a lack of appropriate management
information systems and procedures were not clearly defined.
The Commission should establish a more decentralised management approach that places decision
making authority at the most appropriate level in the system and utilizes the limited resources of the
Commission for managing and controlling the use of Community funds in an optimal manner.
Operational and financial responsibilities should be decentralised away from the central services in
Brussels to the field, and management resources should be reallocated accordingly. The Commission
should simplify procedures and reduce delays.
The Commission should address more realistically the constraints in its own services which affect
programme implementation and the absorption capacity of its South African partners. It should pay
greater attention to strengthening the administrative capacity of its South African partners, whether
governmental or non-governmental.
Donor coordination should be strengthened, especially with, and between, the Member States. In
future trade and cooperation agreements, the Commission and Member States should ensure that the
Union’s commercial policy is supportive of their strategy for development cooperation.C 241/84 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
INTRODUCTION
Background on the European Community Development
Aid Programme regarding South Africa
1. In September 1985, in response to the intensified
political repression in South Africa, the Foreign Ministers
of the European Community (EC) adopted a twin-track
policy of restrictive and positive measures to foster
peaceful transition to democracy (1). The restrictive
measures involved a trade embargo, and economic and
political sanctions. The positive measures launched in
1986 involved support financed from the general budget
of the European Community to victims of apartheid and
disadvantaged communities (2).
2. From 1986 to 1997, a total of 830,2 Mio ECU were
committed to the EC aid programme, for projects in a
wide variety of sectors. The programme passed through
different phases taking into account changes in the
political environment, and the introduction of new
objectives and arrangements for implementation. Three
different conceptual phases can be identified: 1986-1990
(Special Programme to Assist the Victims of Apartheid),
1991-November 1994 (Special Programme for South
Africa) and November 1994-1999 (European Programme
for Reconstruction and Development in South Africa).
Clear cut-off lines between these phases cannot be drawn:
project execution timeframes overlapped these periods
and projects were integrated into successive programmes.
Figure 1 sets out chronologically the political events that
occurred, the measures undertaken by the European
Community in response to these events, and the legal and
operational arrangements that were established. Figure 2
provides further information on each phase.
(1)  Ministerial level political cooperation meeting on 10
September 1985.
(2) EC development aid scheme regarding South Africa has been
funded between 1986 and 1990 from budget line B9530;
between 1991 and 1995 from B7-5070 and, since 1996,
from B7-320.C
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1986
Feb 91
— The Commission opened in Pretoria a Programme
Coordination Office (PCO). Staff under ECA con-
tracts.
— EC involvement in identification & project moni-
toring.
FIGURE 1
EC - South Africa Chronology
1985 Apogee of apartheid
July 85: South Africa Govern-
ment proclaimed National
State of Emergency.
Political difficulties for the
beneficiaries; harassment,
banning orders, imprison-
ment.
Sept 85:
EC Foreign Ministers adopted policy toward South Africa;
which involves:
Trade embargo & economic & political
sanctions
— Ban on oil sales; sanctions on imports of iron,
steel and gold coins
— Ban on new European investments
— No military cooperation
— Discouragement of cultural, scientific &
sporting links
Positive measures to support disadvantaged
communities & victims of apartheid.
1986
— European Parliament & Council decided to
create a budget line in favour of beneficiaries
in South Africa.
— Establishment of the Special Programme to
Assist Victims of Apartheid.
— No specific legal basis; legal framework was defined
mainly by the budgetary comments of the European
Parliament, by the Financial Regulations and by the
projects contracts.
1988
Bomb attacks on Channels
and project beneficiaries’
offices.
— Aid routed through European NGOs and local
Channels (SACC, SACBC, KT & ICFTU).
— Projects implemented by local NGOs.
— No direct involvement of the Commission.
— Relax financial control & reporting
Feb 90
— Apartheid starts to decline
— Unbanning of political op-
position organizations
— Release of political pri-
soners. 
1991 Abolition of the apartheid and
racial laws: ‘Group Areas Act’
& ‘Land Acts’.
Gradual removal of trade embargo and other
sanctions.
The EU aid scheme is renamed the Special Pro-
gramme for South Africa. The SPSA aimed tran-
sition to democracy, incorporating development
objectives.
— Aid routed directly through local Channels (SACC,
SACBC, KT & ICFTU).
— Projects implemented by local NGOs.
Political situation European Community measures towards South Africa Co-operation legal & operative arrangementC
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Jun 95
Start of negotiations on a bilateral trade and co-
operation agreement for the establishment of a
free-trade area.
Jun 95
Council Decision 95/207/EC granting Com-
munity guarantee against losses under loans for
projects in SA, EIB operations.
Political situation European Community measures towards South Africa Co-operation legal & operative arrangement
Dec 93
Council Decision adopting CFSP Joint Action in
support of democratic transition in South Africa.
European Union Electoral Unit for monitoring 94
elections. 
Dec 93
— European Parliament declaration on South Africa.
— Signature of the ‘Establishment Agreement’ for the
EC Delegation in
Pretoria.
1994 The ending of restrictions on military cooperati-
on completes the removal of sanctions.
March 94
EC Delegate presents his credentials.
April 94
— National & Provincial elec-
tions
— Government of National
Unity
Apr 94
Council adopts a package of immediate
measures; offers to negotiate rapidly a coopera-
tion agreement.
May 94
EC Delegation offices are opened in Pretoria.
Oct 94
Signature of a simplified Co-operation agree-
ment; 
Nov 94
SA Parliament adopts the Re-
construction & Development
Programme (RDP)
Nov 94
— The aid scheme is renamed as European Pro-
gramme for Reconstruction & Development
(EPRD).
— The scheme supports policies and reforms un-
dertaken by the SA Government under the
RDP for improving living conditions.
Nov 94
South Africa Government becomes the EC's interlocu-
tor on development policy; projects implemented
through Government services (Central, Regional &
Local) and NGOs.
Dec 94
Council approves the co-operation agreement.
Dec 94
PCO is closed; responsibilities are taken over by the
Delegation
May 95
Signature of the Declaration of Intent; EU com-
mitment to the Government RDPC
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Political situation European Community measures towards South Africa Co-operation legal & operative arrangement
May 96
The Constitutional Assembly
adopts the South Africa
Constitution
Nov 96
Council Regulation No 2259/96 on development co-
operation with SA; legal basis for administrative, finan-
cial & operative arrangements. 
Apr 97
South Africa becomes a member of the Lomé
Convention.
May 97
Signature of the Indicative Programme
1999 End of timeframe for the RDP End of timeframe for the EPRD End of timeframe for Council Regulation No 2259/96
Source: Court of Auditors & Evaluation of the European SPSA (SPM, 1996).C 241/88 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
FIGURE 2
EC development aid scheme regarding South Africa
Phase I — 1986-1990
Special Programme for the Victims of Apartheid (SPVA)
Aim: To foster transition to a peaceful, stable, democratic and non racial South
Africa by assisting the victims of political repression.
Main areas targeted: — Humanitarian & social initiatives;
— Training & education;
— Legal assistance.
Implementing organisations: — European NGOs.
— South African Channels: SACC, SACBC, KT & ICFTU.
Organisational
arrangements:
The Commission was not involved in the definition, appraisal, monitoring
& implementation of the projects.
Legal responsibility laid on European NGOs.
Appropriations committed 108,6 Mio ECU
Phase II — 1991-Nov 1994
Special Programme to South Africa (SPSA)
Aim: To foster transition to a democratic and prosperous South Africa by
integrating development objectives and supporting disadvantage
communities
Main areas targeted: — Tertiary & adult education;
— Vocational training;
— Primary health care;
— Community & rural development;
— Human rights & democracy.
Implementing organisations: — South African Channels: SACC, SACBC, KT & ICFTU
— No intervention of European NGOs.
Organisational
arrangements:
The Commission was involved through the Project Coordination Office
(PCO) in the identification. assessment and monitoring of projects.
Appropriations committed: 230,7 Mio ECU
Phase III — Nov 1994-1999
European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD)
Aim: To foster transition to a democratic and prosperous South Africa by
supporting policies and reforms undertaken by the South African
Government under the Reconstruction and Development Programme
1994-1999
Main areas targeted: — Education & training;
— Health;
— Rural & Urban development;
— Economic co-operation, trade & investment promotion, support for
small, medium and micro enterprises;
— The promotion of good governance and democratisation.
Implementing organisations: — Central, provincial en local government structures;
— Transitional National Development Trust (TNDT) & local NGOs.
Organisational
arrangements:
The Commission is directly involved in project management and
monitoring through the EC Delegation in Pretoria.
Appropriations committed: 479,5 Mio ECU (at 31.12.1997)
Source: Court of Auditors. Evaluation of the European SPSA (SPM, 1996), accounts of the Commission 1986-1996.C 241/89 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
3. The first phase covered the period 1986-90. A total
of 108,6 Mio ECU was committed to over 400 projects
in areas of humanitarian and legal assistance and
education. The vast majority of these projects were
promoted by three local organisations called the
‘Channels’ (3): the Kagiso Trust (KT) an
interdenominational body formed by the churches and
trade unions in South Africa, the South African Catholic
Bishops’ Conference (SACBC), the South African Council
of Churches (SACC) and, to a lesser extent, by the
European-based International Conference of Trade
Unions (ICFTU).
4. During this phase there was no direct link between
the Commission and the Channels: contractual
responsibility towards the Commission for the projects
lay with European non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) which were responsible for forwarding the funds
to the Channels in South Africa and for financial and
narrative reports. The programme was carried out in the
face of active opposition from the South African
Government and the beneficiaries were normally
opponents of the regime and subject to harassment,
banning orders and imprisonment. The Commission
adapted its normal financial control and reporting
requirements to the realities of the situation and treated
the projects with a high degree of confidentiality.
5. In 1990, the political situation in South Africa
evolved positively and the trade embargo and economic
and political sanctions were gradually lifted. In 1991, the
EC aid programme entered a second phase and was
reorientated to take into account development objectives
and new sectors. The involvement of European NGOs
came to an end and the Commission concluded project
contracts directly with the Channels in South Africa. The
political situation did not yet permit the establishment of
an EC Delegation in Pretoria. The Commission, however,
opened a Programme Coordination Office (PCO) in
February 1991 staffed by technical assistants under
European Association for Cooperation (ECA) contracts,
in order to provide support to partners and to monitor
projects.
6. The third phase of the EC programme of assistance to
South Africa began in November 1994 following the
democratic elections, the establishment of the
Government of National Unity and the conclusion of the
(3) The term ‘Channels’ is used to describe these associations
because the Commission channelled through them the funds
of the Programme to the implementing organisations.
Cooperation Agreement between the EC and the
Republic of South Africa (4). The aim of this phase, called
the European Programme for Reconstruction and
Development (EPRD), is to contribute to South Africa’s
harmonious and sustainable development and to
consolidate democratic society. The South African
Government is now the interlocutor of the EC in the
development policy dialogue. Project implementation has
been opened as a priority to central, regional and local
government departments; further, instead of the
traditional Channels, local NGOs are financed directly
for sectoral programmes and a Transitional National
Development Trust (TNDT) (5) has been established to
direct funds to local NGOs for small projects.
7. In December 1993, the agreement for the
establishment of the Delegation of the EC in South Africa
was signed. The Delegation offices were opened in
Pretoria in May 1994 and the PCO was closed in
December 1994. Finally, in November 1996, the Council
adopted a regulation on development cooperation with
South Africa (6), which set out the legal basis for the
EPRD operations; 500 Mio ECU was earmarked to
finance the EPRD during the period 1996-99. The
National Indicative programme was signed by the South
African Government and the Commission in May 1997.
8. Since November 1994, EC-South Africa relationships
have also developed in other political, commercial and
economic areas. In June 1995 negotiations of a bilateral
trade agreement for the establishment of a free-trade area
were opened. Such an agreement is of major importance
for the development of the South African economy,
progress has been slow and discussions were ongoing at
the date of adoption of this report. In April 1997, South
Africa became a member of the Lome ´ Convention
concluded between the EC and the Africa, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries (7).
(4) The Agreement was signed in Pretoria in October 1994 and
approved by the Council on 19 December 1994 (OJ L 341,
30.12.1994).
(5) The TNDT is the first step towards the creation of a
National Development Agency which will ensure NGOs
funding in the future.
(6) Council Regulation (EC) 2259/96 of 22 November 1996 on
development cooperation with South Africa (OJ L 306,
28.11.1996).
(7) The EC aid programme to South Africa will, however,
continue to be financed from the EC General Budget as
South Africa’s accession to the Convention is limited.C 241/90 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
The Court’s audit policy towards EC’s South Africa Aid
Programme
9. In 1991 the Court reviewed the Commission’s
administration of the programme to date and identified,
after taking into account the management and control
constraints under which the Commission and its partners
were working, a number of weaknesses: incomplete files;
lack of progress reports; the weak role of the European
NGOs in project implementation, and poor financial
management (over-funding of projects, large outstanding
balances and non-recovery of unused amounts).
10. In 1993 and 1994, the Court examined the financial
accounts regarding the South African aid programme.
The Court pointed out to the Commission that financial
management was weak: the Commission did not have up
to date information on the volume of funds in the bank
accounts of the Channels; unnecessarily large amounts
were being held in these accounts and there was no
policy for the treatment of interest earned. In addition,
there was a backlog of more than 750 projects dating
back to 1986 which had not been closed and, in some
cases, final payments were still outstanding. The services
of the Commission appeared not to have the capacity to
deal with this.
11. The findings of the above audits were communicated
to the Commission but were not published in Court
reports. In order to follow up these findings, and the
Commission’s response to them, in 1996 the Court
started a comprehensive audit of programme to South
Africa.
12. A mission to South Africa was carried out in 1997,
involving meetings and documentary checks at the EC
Delegation, at the Government Departments, at the
Channels organisations, at the NGOs and at other
organisations. A sample of projects were visited on the
spot, final beneficiaries were interviewed and physical
achievements were checked.
13. The Court’s enquiry covered the following
elements:
(a)  the procedures and systems applied by the
Commission and by the Channels for managing
projects approved during the period 1993-94 which
were still being implemented in 1997 (paragraphs 20
— 52). Particular attention was paid to the Bursary
Programme implemented by Kagiso Trust, which was
the largest EC operation carried out in South Africa
(Annex);
(b)  the procedures and systems applied by the
Commission, South African Government departments,
NGOs and other organisations for projects financed
under the EPRD (paragraphs 53 — 85);
(c)  the organisation of the Commission services
(paragraphs 86 — 92) and how the co-ordination
between the Community and the Member States in
the sphere of development is working in South Africa
(paragraphs 93 — 97).
14. In the following pages, a number of shortcomings in
the financial management and control of the EC’s aid
programme are set out. This notwithstanding, it should
be emphasised as a general conclusion that, in spite of the
difficult conditions in which the programme was carried
out, the EC was able, during the first two phases, to
support projects which contributed to the democratic
transition in South Africa and which relieved victims of
apartheid and disadvantaged communities (8). With the
start of the EPRD, a new era for development
cooperation with South Africa is beginning, an era in
which basic principles of cost-efficiency, financial control
and accountability must be observed by both the
Commission and the South African partners.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUDGET
15. The impact on the budget of aid to South Africa for
the whole of the 1986 to 1997 period is shown in Figure
3. Out of the total of 818,9 Mio ECU committed
between 1986 and 1997, only 456,0 Mio ECU (56 %)
was disbursed. At the end of 1997 the commitments still
to be settled, consisting mainly of projects under the
EPRD, totalled 352,6 Mio ECU (9).
(8) See the Evaluation of the European Special Programme on
South Africa. SPM Consultants; October 1996.
(9) Of the original amounts committed, 10,2 Mio ECU were
decommitted.C 241/91EN Official Journal of the European Communities31.7.98
FIGURE 3
Use of funds allocated for programmes in South Africa 1986—1997
Mio ECU
Year
Budget
heading
Description
Commitments
Appropria-
tions
available
Appropria-
tions
committed
%
Payments
Appropria-
tions
available
Amounts
paid
%
Cancellations
against
previous
commitments
Amounts still
to be paid
Accumulated
figures
1 2 3 4 5 6=5/4 7 8 9=8/7 10 11=5-8-10
1986 953Progr. of positive measures
regarding South Africa
10,0 6,6 66 5,0 3,4 68 3,2
1987 953Progr. of positive measures
regarding South Africa
23,4 18,6 79 16,6 13,1 79 8,7
1988 9530Progr. of positive measures
regarding South Africa
29,9 29,9 100 23,4 22,7 97 15,9
1989 9530Progr. of positive measures
regarding South Africa
23,5 23,5 100 19,5 18,6 95 20,8
1990 9530Progr. of positive measures
regarding South Africa
30,0 30,0 100 37,8 34,4 91 16,4
1991 B7-5070Progr. of positive measures
regarding South Africa
58,0 58,0 100 47,7 47,7 100 26,7
1992 B7-5070Progr. of positive measures
regarding South Africa
80,0 80,0 100 66,5 66,4 100 40,3
1993 B7-5070Progr. of positive measures
regarding South Africa
90,0 89,8 100 72,9 60,4 83 0,6 69,2
1994 B7-5070Progr. of positive measures
regarding South Africa
102,5 102,1 100 80,5 58,0 72 0,1 113,2
1995 B7-5070European programme for
reconstruction and
development in South Africa
125,0 123,3 99 92,3 45,1 49 0,3 191,1
1996 B7-320European programme for
reconstruction and
development in South Africa
130,0 129,2 99 110,0 28,5 26 1,3 290,5
1997 B7-320Cooperation with South Africa 127,8 127,8 100 60,5 57,8 96 7,9 352,6
Total 830,2 818,9 99 632,6 456,0 72 10,2
0
50
100
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200
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300
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400
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Appropriations committed and still not paid
400
350
300
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50
0
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Source:  Commission revenue and expenditure account 1986-1997
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Payment appropriations granted by Channel 1993-1996
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C 241/92 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
16. Over the last three years the amount of
commitments remaining to be settled rose markedly. This
highlights a number of interrelated points which are
examined further in this report. The increase with the
introduction of the EPRD in the availability of
commitment appropriations has run ahead of the
capability of the Commission and the South African
authorities to spend the funds. The absolute level of
payments declined considerably from 1994 to 1996,
despite the continued increase in payment appropriations
available. The rate of utilisation of payment
appropriations in 1995 and 1996 was very low, reflecting
the problems encountered in implementing the EPRD.
The budgeted levels of commitment and payment
appropriations indicate that the Commission did not
anticipate these problems.
17. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the EC commitment
and payment appropriations granted to the Channels
between 1993 and 1996; this figure shows the drastic
decline in 1995. Figure 5 sets out the payment
appropriations by Channel; KT was the largest
beneficiary of the EC funds (82 % of payment
appropriations), followed by the SACBC (14 %). Figure 6
presents the sectoral breakdown of the projects; the most
important sectors, which totalled 77 % of the
commitments, were the Bursaries for tertiary education,
Community development and Education and vocational
training.
Total
Number of projects
1993 126
1994 61
1995 2
1996 —
Total 189
FIGURE 4
Appropriations by beneficiary Channel (Mio ECU) 1993-1996
Kagiso Trust
Commitments Payments
1993 62,3 29,0
1994 55,6 34,3
1995 5,9 20,9
1996 — 4,6
Total 123,8 88,9
SACBC
Commitments Payments
1993 12,9 8,1
1994 4,2 4,8
1995 — 1,4
1996 — 0,3
Total 17,1 14,6
SACC
Commitments Payments
1993 1,6 0,7
1994 2,5 1,6
1995 — 0,4
1996 — 0,2
Total 4,2 3,0
ICFTU
Commitments Payments
1993 1,2 0,7
1994 0,6 0,4
1995 — 0,2
1996 — 0,0
Total 1,8 1,3
Commitments Payments
1993 78,1 38,6
1994 62,9 41,1
1995 5,9 23,0
1996 — 5,2
Total 146,8 107,9
Source: SINCOMC 241/93 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
FIGURE 6
Breakdown by sector of commitment appropriations granted to Channels, 1993-1996 (%)
Sector
Bursaries for tertiary education 40,9%
Community development & women 22,6%
Education and vocational training 14,2%
Miscellaneous 5,5%
Primary health care 5,1%
Administrative cost of the channels 4,8%
Rural development & agriculture 2,8%
Media 2,7%
Trade union support 1,3%
Total 100,0%
Source: SINCOM & SAPMAN.C
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FIGURE 7
EPRD budget outturn 1994-1996
Mio ECU
FIGURE 8
Allocation of aid (commitments) between government and NGO 1994-1996
Government NGO TOTAL
Commitments Payments Commitments Payments Commitments Payments
1994 16,9 5,9 10,2 7,2 27,1 13,1
1995 77,7 11,7 39,3 18,8 117,0 30,5
1996 114,8 2,1 14,4 2,6 129,2 4,7
Total 209,5 19,7 63,9 28,6 273,4 48,4
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18. The variation in Community commitments and
payments for the new programme (EPRD) between 1994
and 1996 is shown in Figure 7. This shows how the
growth since 1994 of unspent commitments is almost
entirely explained by the situation of the Government
projects. Of the 16 Government projects funded during
the period, only five had actually got underway by the
beginning of 1997. Figure 8 shows how, following the
normalisation of development cooperation with South
Africa, the financing of NGO projects assumed a more
modest role, falling from 38 % in 1994 to only 11 % in
1996. However, it should be noted that implementation
of the projects that are directly cofinanced with the
government is, in fact, partially delegated to NGOs. In
the indicative programme signed in May 1997 (10) the
amount earmarked for decentralised cooperation
accounts for 25 % of the EPRD annual financial
package.
19. The sectoral allocation of the EPRD programmes
funded between 1994 and 1996 is shown in Figure 9.
Projects in the ‘Good governance and Democratisation’
and ‘Education and Training’ sectors are the most
significant.
FIGURE 9
EPRD: Allocation by sector 1994-1996
Sector Projects
Commitments
in Mio ECU in %
Good governance and democratisation 9 72 26,3
Education and training 7 54 19,7
Rural development 5 40 14,6
Multi-sectoral projects 2 28 10,2
Health 10 26 9,5
Housing 1 25 9,1
SMEs 2 20 7,3
Urban development 1 6 2,2
Trade and Investment promotion 2 3 1,1
Total 39 274 100,0
Source: SINCOM.
SYSTEM FOR IMPLEMENTING PROJECTS THROUGH
THE CHANNELS
Introduction
20. The Channels system which operated during the first
two Phases of the EC aid programme has been replaced
by the arrangements under the EPRD. During 1997,
however, there remained some projects started in 1994
and 1995 which were still being implemented. The key
observations on the Channels system are presented here
in order to highlight those weaknesses in the system
which should be avoided in future Community
programmes, whether in relation to South Africa or
elsewhere.
21. The observations presented below deal mainly with
procedures, systems and management arrangements.
There is a need also to consider the achievements and the
impact of the programme run through the Channels
system. There is, however, little firm information on
which to base an assessment, because few evaluations
have been carried out. Apart from one overall evaluation
covering the period 1986-94 carried out for the
Commission by consultants in 1995 (11), out of more
than 700 projects, only four have been evaluated
including the Bursary Programme (12). No sectoral
evaluations have been carried out.
22. The consultants who carried out the overall
evaluation in 1995 reported that, in general, the Special
Programme up to 1995 was a success, relevant to the
needs of the target population, had had a significant
positive impact on political developments in the country,
and contributed to the demise of apartheid. They
(10)  National Indicative Programme signed by the Commission
and the South African government on 14 May 1997.
(11)  ‘Evaluation of the European Special Programme on South
Africa’, SPM Consultants, October 1996.
(12)  See paragraph 10 in the Annex on the Bursary Programme.C 241/96 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
considered that the Programme was particularly
successful during the early years (before 1991), when
projects were initiated from below and there was a high
degree of involvement in and ‘ownership’ of projects by
beneficiaries, with high levels of creativity and
enthusiasm. It was noted, however, that, notably after
1991 and as far as operational procedures were
concerned, there was much irritation and frustration
stemming from the involvement of too many parties in
the management chain, a lack of common understanding
of who had authority over what, unclear and
misunderstood procedures, and a shortage of staff. The
Commission was seen as a slow, bureaucratic
organisation, which took too long to approve projects
and process payments. Reporting requirements were
unclear, involved duplication of work, and generated
little substantive feedback.
23. Figures 10 and 11 sketch the responsibilities of the
different parties for approving, paying and implementing
projects funded through Channels. These procedures
developed in an ad-hoc manner, according to the clauses
in the standard project contracts concluded between the
Commission and the Channels.C 241/97 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
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FIGURE 11
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24. The distinctive feature of the system was that there
was no direct link between the European Commission
and the project holders; all relations passed through the
Channels which were the sole interlocutors with the
Commission. This entailed filtering funding applications,
concluding contracts, managing and disbursing EC funds,
monitoring and assisting holders and reporting progress.
Observations concerning the Channels system (13)
Design weaknesses
25. The Channels system had key weaknesses which
hindered adequate control and sound financial
(13)  (Observations concerning the Bursary Programme are
included in the Annex).C 241/99 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
management and which caused shortcomings in the
implementation of the projects. Firstly, there were too
many organisations and levels of the Commission services
involved in the administration of the system (project
holders, the Channels, the Commission Delegation and
Central Services) with overlapping responsibilities and
insufficient information flows and coordination. Decision
making was slow, with the result that both payments and
the implementation of actions were delayed.
26. Secondly, the Channels and the Commission over a
short period had to identify, appraise, execute and
monitor a large number of small projects (14). Most of
them were managed by NGOs and Community Based
Organisations (CBOs) with limited administrative
capacity. As a result, the number of decisions to be taken,
checks and financial transactions to be handled was very
high. The Commission did not have adequate resources
to deal with this workload.
27. Finally, the results of the examination of the
Channels system highlight some of the endemic
weaknesses in the Commission’s management of
development cooperation programmes on which the
Court has commented repeatedly in its reports.
Formulation of projects
28. From the outset projects were poorly formulated:
essential elements (such as the budget, total donors’
contributions and a timetable for the activities) were not
clearly defined or were completely absent, terms of
reference were incomplete and confused. Despite attempts
by the Commission to improve matters by introducing in
1993 the use of logical frameworks (15) for project design
and implementation, these weaknesses remained up to the
end of the Channels system.
29. Unrealistic implementation timetables in the
contracts were the source of problems. Almost all
projects requested the extension of the original timetable
on several occasions. The Commission approved these
(14)  Between 1993-95 the Commission approved 189 projects
with the Channels, most of them for amounts of less than
0,2 Mio ECU. To this number should be added the running
projects approved in previous years. Around 700 projects
remained open during the considered period.
(15)  The logical framework is a management tool aimed at
improving project designing, planning and monitoring. It is
used by major development aid donors.
extensions without analysing what had been achieved, the
plan to complete the projects or the real possibilities to
respect the new deadlines. From the documentation
contained in the Commission’s files it was not always
possible to check that the contracts were extended in
accordance with the proper procedures and that deadlines
fixed for the financial commitments had been respected.
Projects were identified for which the timetable was
extended after the initial one had expired.
30. Extending contract deadlines placed a considerable
administrative workload on the holders, the Channels
and the Commission. For example, in 1996 192
extension operations were processed through the system,
with each one having to be approved in Brussels.
Similarly, the contracts did not provide for any procedure
for modifying the project budget; minor changes had to
be approved by the Commission’s central services in
Brussels and be the subject of contract riders. This led to
payment and operational delays.
Financial and treasury management
31. In 1994 and 1995 the Court pointed out in letters
to the Commission that it had not monitored adequately
the management of the funds transferred to the Channels.
It had failed to ensure that the Channels submitted
financial reports reconciling the funds transferred by the
Commission to their EU project bank account, the
amounts disbursed to the project holders, and the interest
accrued. Excessive balances had built up notably in the
KT project account, and considerable interest earned,
about which the Commission, both in Brussels and in
South Africa, had wholly inadequate information.
Following the intervention of the Court, the Commission
took some action. By 1997 the situation had improved in
the case of the largest Channel, KT, but not in those of
the other Channels.
32. The contracts with the project holders provided that
payments were to be made in ECU and converted into
local currency (ZAR) applying the monthly rates
published in the EC Official Journal to the expenditure
incurred in the same month. This provision was both
inappropriate and impractical since it would have obliged
the Channels to keep a bank account in ECU (not
permitted by the South African monetary authorities),C 241/100 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
and to identify the monthly payments for each project,
on which to base disbursements. In practice, the
Channels converted funds received from the Commission
immediately into ZAR and deposited the proceeds in a
local currency bank account. Although the Commission
was aware of this, it did not modify the terms of the
contracts accordingly.
Payment and reporting
33. Project payment and reporting procedures in the
contracts were deficient and did not permit adequate
monitoring by the Channels and the Commission.
34. The contracts with the project holders neither
specified the period to which reports should refer, nor
fixed deadlines for submission. Reporting was exclusively
linked to payments; as a result, the project holders only
provided reports when they requested disbursements. If
an organisation did not request a payment, no report was
provided. In addition, the contracts did not set out
sufficiently what the narrative and financial reports
should contain.
35. The majority of the Channels’ projects involved the
funding of the recurrent costs of the beneficiary
organisations. In many cases, however, reporting
problems arose because the contract period did not
correspond to the financial year of the organisation,
which is the normal period for accounting for and
reporting on the activities financed by the contract.
Further, when in effect the Commission was providing an
annual grant to an organisation, it signed a new contract
before the previous ones had been reported on and
cleared. For some organisations, the Commission had
open at the same time separate contracts funding
different years.
36. Reporting required cumbersome and complicated
reconciliations. The difficulty of financial reporting meant
that the Commission’s services often rejected the reports
submitted. This caused frequent interruptions and delays
in payments, leading to uncertainty for the holders,
jeopardizing the execution of activities and hindering
effective monitoring.
37. An analysis of project execution at 31 December
1996 shows that:
(a)  of the 189 projects approved between 1993 and
1995, around 75 had the last instalment outstanding
for several years. This could be an indication that the
projects were overfunded, and that there are unused
balances at the project holder — it is part of the
closure exercise (paragraphs 40 — 52) to identify this.
On the other hand it could indicate that in some cases
holders preferred to lose the final 10 % payment
rather than produce a final report. From the point of
view of the holder this may be seen to be a reasonable
option, taking into account the small payment due
and the trouble of producing and getting the reports
approved;
(b) more than 50 projects had not submitted or had not
had the interim report approved; these were projects
which had received an advance of 50 % or 60 % of
the project amount on the signature of the contract
but for which the second instalment had not been
paid.
38. Most of the project reports submitted were
accompanied by audit reports on the accounts. These
reports were, however, of limited value, since they did
not tackle the key problems relating to the EC funding;
for example, the period to be covered by the report,
other grants and double financing. In the case of the
Bursary Programme, the audit exercise, the key control
mechanism, was of limited value because of the lack of
adequate terms of reference to the auditors and the
absence of follow-up of findings in the audit reports (see
Annex, paragraph 4).
Project monitoring
39. The Commission did not monitor the projects
adequately. This was because of the weaknesses of the
reporting procedures mentioned above, the lack of
project tracking computer tools and failures of the
Commission information system.
40. The monitoring of SACC and SACBC projects, for
which very little information is available, was particularly
weak. Of 14 SACC and SACBC projects approved in
1993 and 1994 and totalling 7,66 Mio ECU, the
documentation held in the Commission’s files was
insufficient to assess the current status of the projects.
Indeed the Commission did not know whether 8 projects
of the 14 were still active. In only 2 cases, progress
project reports had been submitted. In spite of the lack of
information, the Commission had extended project
implementation time frames on several occasions.C 241/101 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
41. The Commission’s monitoring of KT projects was
also inadequate, although some improvements were made
after 1995.
42. As a consequence of weak monitoring, the
Commission was unable to react promptly to holders’
and Channels’ queries. Numerous projects suffered
delays, were in a stand-by situation for long periods, had
been definitively halted or were unable to meet their
objectives. As far as the Bursary Programme was
concerned, lack of supervision and of reliable figures
reduced effectiveness and sustainability. Although around
34 000 bursaries were granted, the opportunity to grant
8 700 more was missed because of inefficient
management, and more than 72 Mio ZAR
(approximately 12,5 Mio ECU at December 1996
exchange rates) in reimbursements were not paid into the
SA national bursary scheme (see Annex, paragraph 17).
43. The ability of the Commission to monitor
adequately the implementation of projects was weakened
by the poor state of its information systems. It did not
have a satisfactory computerized database containing
details of project implementation and reporting (16).
Documentation in project files was not up to date, and
reports and correspondence were sometimes missing.
Information between the Channels, the Commission
Delegation and Central Services was not always passed
on. The Commission did not have a copy of all the
contracts signed between the Channels and the project
holders, and thus was not aware of those cases where the
project scope and financial conditions differed from its
contract with the Channel.
44. A financial consequence of unsatisfactory
monitoring was that projects which were approved but
which never started, or projects which started but became
inactive, still remain unnecessarily opened in the
Commission accounts. Thus about 10 Mio ECU in
respect of projects committed between 1993 and 1995
but which never started, or became inactive, remained in
the accounts at 31 December 1996, overstating
outstanding liabilities.
Closure of Contracts
45. Following audits in 1994 and 1995, the Court
pointed out to the Commission that it should give
(16)  The South Africa Project Management (SAPMAN), a
spreadsheet application used by the Commission, did not
contain reliable information, since it was not regularly
up-dated. The application was abandoned in December
1995.
priority to closing a large backlog of more than 750
contracts, in respect of which a total of 441,7 Mio ECU
had been committed, going back to 1986. The
Commission informed the Court at the end of 1995 that
it aimed to close some 350 outstanding contracts by July
1996, and that a technical assistant had been employed
to reinforce the capacity of its services to carry out this
task.
46. In January 1996 the deadline for closure of the 350
projects was extended to end-December 1996. The
overall target was then to close 604 projects out of the
664 projects dating from 1986-93 by the end of 1997.
47. By the end of June 1997, however, none of the
contracts in the backlog had been closed. The
Commission encountered serious procedural difficulties
during 1996, largely because of inadequate planning and
definition of the task, and the failure to devote sufficient
resources to it. A review by the Court of a sample of 250
closure sheets that were prepared in 1996 showed that
there were numerous unexplained anomalies, and that the
supporting information presented was quite inadequate
for decision-making purposes.
48. In order to increase the capacity of the services to
close the old projects, the Commission decided in March
1996 to engage private sector audit firms. It took the
Commission, however, more than a year to engage these
auditors, contracts with two separate firms finally being
signed in May and July 1997 respectively.
49. During 1997 the services concerned established
revised procedures requiring more justification for the
actions proposed, which include recovery or write-off of
outstanding balances held by implementing organisations,
and the cancellation of unneeded commitment balances.
New targets were fixed, with final closure of all
non-active projects from the period 1986-1994 to be
achieved by the end of 1998.
50. A corollary of the lack of progress in closing
contracts is that little progress was made during the
closure exercise in recovering surplus funds held by
NGOs in Europe or in South Africa. During missions to
European NGOs in 1995 and 1996 such surpluses were
found in a number of cases. Contrary to the
Commission’s own internal rules, however, which require
that recovery orders be established as soon as a debt is
identified, with a ‘pm’ mention if the amount cannot beC 241/102 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
precisely evaluated, recovery orders were only issued in
respect of one NGO.
51. The problems encountered by the Commission in
closing this large backlog of projects reflect the
weaknesses of financial management of the South African
programme. Consistently, and despite the size and
political importance of the programme with South Africa,
the Commission did not allocate sufficient resources and
did not have sufficiently robust and effective management
procedures so as to enable the new and expanding
programme to be prepared and implemented, at the same
time as the closure exercise. The priority accorded to the
new programme always meant that the limited resources
were drawn away from the closure exercise.
52. Further, the closure exercise was badly prepared,
with inadequate objectives and milestones, procedures
were unclear, roles and responsibilities of those involved
were not sufficiently defined and agreed, and there was
no common understanding on what was needed to enable
projects to be closed. As a result, the limited resources
available were not used efficiently or effectively.
THE EUROPEAN PROGRAMME FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT (EPRD) 1994-1996
The EPRD system
53. Following the democratisation of the country a new
approach to cooperation became necessary. At that point
it became a matter of funding a programme of direct
cooperation with the South African government.
54. In a climate of considerable optimism all the donors,
including the European Community (EC) and the
Member States, were eager to launch large-scale
development programmes in association with the
government. The EC, the largest donor (17), had
supported the South African forces for democracy
throughout the apartheid era and now wanted to increase
its support for the new government in a legitimate way.
Within a relatively short period the Commission thus
approved several programmes for substantial amounts in
several areas of activity.
(17)  The Council Regulation (EC) No 2259/96 of 22 November
1996 provides in Article 10 for a financial reference amount
of 500 Mio ECU for the period 1.1.1996-31.12.1999.
55. This was why, in 1994, the EC, like other donors,
joined the reconstruction and development programme
launched by the South African government. More than
5 000 million ZAR (approximately 1 150 Mio ECU)
annually from the national budget were pooled with
international aid to form the RDP Fund, with a
specially-created central administrative structure, the RDP
Office. However, the latter soon proved to be unsuitable
and in March 1996, following criticism of the low level
of programme implementation, the RDP Office was
closed and its responsibilities for programme
implementation transferred to the Ministry of Finance
and the sectoral ministries.
56. At that time South Africa’s central administration
underwent major restructuring, with important changes
at the top levels. The government departments which
initiated the execution of development programmes had
only limited experience of working with international aid
organisations. The South African administration faced
serious difficulties in bringing its systems and procedures
into line with the various donor requirements. New
structures had only just been created at provincial and
local level and others were still at the planning stage.
57. In this context, the EC — and other donor
organisations — should have been more realistic about
the volume of funds that could be efficiently and
effectively absorbed by the South African administration.
In the case of individual programmes, such as the health
sector and the Land Reform Pilot Project, the
Commission should have recognised that until the
provincial and district structures through which the
programme was to be implemented were established, the
funds for the programme could not be absorbed. Further,
in light of the limited resources and sectoral capabilities
of the staff of the Commission Delegation, it would have
been preferable for the Commission, with the agreement
of the South African authorities, to have concentrated
fewer resources on a more limited number of sectors.
58. At the time when the programme was launched in
1994 the Commission was, in fact, also facing serious
problems. The headquarters department in Brussels was
required to simultaneously monitor and close the projects
funded via the Channels (paragraphs 20 — 52),
programme the EPRD and examine the related files and
negotiate the legal framework for the new relationship ofC 241/103 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
cooperation with South Africa (18). There was a similar
lack of resources at the Delegation (paragraph 90).
59. The problems of managing such a broad programme
with the limited resources available led the Commission
to change its approach to the financing of NGO projects
and activities. The NGOs were encouraged to get
together and to combine their applications for finance for
action in a particular sector — health, urban
development, rural development, etc — in programme
form.
60. In adopting this approach the Commission should,
however, have paid particular attention to the
organisational structures responsible for implementing it
and ought to have ensured that they had the necessary
skills and resources. Of the three sectoral programmes
audited by the Court two had substantial weaknesses at
the level of the structures responsible for the overall
programme:
(a) in the case of the ‘Urban sector network’ programme,
the Coordination Office (PCO) proposed a
coordinating structure in the form of a NGO which
had neither internal rules nor adequate resources and
was unable to monitor the programme components
regularly;
(b)  in the case of the health sector programme, the
activities of three NGOs operating in the same region
were combined under one contract. Responsibility for
managing and monitoring the whole programme was
unilaterally assigned to one of the NGOs by the
Commission. It was difficult for the former to
produce the required progress reports, as the other
partners had different management systems and
structured their accounts differently. Moreover, the
NGO did not have the resources required to monitor
the operations.
61. In the case of the smaller projects carried out by the
NGOs and the community-based organisations (CBOs),
the Minister responsible for the EPRD was instructed, in
1994, to find a solution that would allow these projects
to be funded within a coordinated framework and
proposed the creation of an independent body, TNDT.
However, the establishment of TNDT was slow and the
(18)  The task force responsible for the negotiations was not set
up until March 1995.
funding of NGOs and CBOs was severely disrupted in
1995 and 1996. Some of them were obliged to cut back
on staff and activities.
Government projects
62. In the health part of the first series of programmes
cofinanced with the Government, in 1994, the Court
audited the National HIV/AIDS Programme, the District
Health Systems Support Programme and the Technical
assistance programme for restructuring the national
health system, which amounted to 19,4 Mio ECU in
total. At the time of the audit none of the projects had
progressed very far. The programmes had, in fact, been
started before the structures that were essential for their
implementation had been put in place. For example, the
districts on which the new health system was to be based
were not fully established until the second half of 1996,
which delayed the actual introduction of the measures at
the province level. It also resulted in the South African
authorities asking for the execution phase of the three
programmes to be extended to the end of 1997.
63. The Human rights programme was approved by the
Commission in December 1994 on the basis of a study
carried out by external consultants. The financing
agreement with the South African government was for an
amount of 15 Mio ECU and was not signed until May
1996. This government programme is being carried out
by NGOs and a special foundation was set up to
administer it. The programme was launched after a very
long delay and in March 1997, at the time of the Court’s
audits, the project had barely got under way.
64. The aims of the project are somewhat vague. The
1996/1997 action plan was based on the results of the
study mentioned above, which was carried out in 1994;
the amount of expenditure required was very much an
estimate and was not supported by a breakdown of the
calculations. The situation in the country changed
between 1994 and 1996 and updating of the objectives
and resources to be employed was found to be necessary.
This assessment was acknowledged by the people
responsible for implementing the programme, who had
also included an initial exploratory phase of clarifying
needs and objectives in their action plan. However, they
thought it important for the project to start, and
proposed to make the necessary adjustments at a later
stage rather than wait for the results of this first stage.
The Commission should monitor developments on this
programme carefully.C 241/104 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
65. The Parliamentary Support Programme (total cost
36 Mio ECU) is cofinanced by three partners. The actual
start of the programme was planned for the end of 1996.
In March 1997 it had still not started because the staff
required to manage it had still not been fully recruited.
Moreover the actual arrangements for implementing this
jointly-funded programme were not satisfactory. At the
time of the Court audits the three donors’ contributions
had not yet been combined within a single budget. It was,
therefore, not possible to understand and verify how the
South African government’s contribution (19,35 Mio
ECU) was to be incorporated and allocated to the
programme. The work programme which had recently
been tabled by the South African authorities covered only
the Community contribution (16 Mio ECU). It is
important that the Commission verifies the reality of the
joint funding for this programme.
NGO projects
66. For the NGOs these were the first projects to be
funded directly by the Commission, without the
intermediary Channels. Their lack of experience of
Community procedures, the difficulty of obtaining the
necessary advice from the Delegation and the problems of
communicating with Commission headquarters produced
start-up delays for all the projects visited by the Court.
NGOs must present an annual work programme in order
to obtain payment of Community funds, but they had
not been given adequate instructions (notably in the
financing agreements) regarding the nature and level of
breakdown of the information required. In most cases
this resulted in the Commission’s referring the files
submitted back to the NGOs. In some cases programmes
were accepted by the Delegation after lengthy exchanges
of information with the NGOs, only to be rejected
subsequently by Brussels, so that they then had to be
resubmitted. This two-tier approval procedure is not an
efficient use of the Commission’s limited
project-management resources and it also caused
excessive delays in implementation.
67. The Participatory Health Care Programme (1,12
Mio ECU) covered the essential needs of the most
disadvantaged people in the townships around Cape
Town. The initial stages of the programme were
particularly affected by the weaknesses mentioned in the
previous paragraph. In addition, the viability of the
programme, which was in the final stage of
implementation in March 1997, was also at risk. The
contract that was signed with the Commission in fact
stipulated that the hospitals for which finance was
provided were to be incorporated into the South African
government health-care structures, but this was not done.
Further funding by the international donors then became
essential, so as not to imperil the continuation of the
services that had been available till then.
68. The provision of low-cost housing for people with
low incomes was one of the main objectives of the Urban
Sector Network programme (5,9 Mio ECU). Of the 4
350 houses that were to be provided in the first year only
879 could be handed over, because the Commission and
its partner had under-estimated the difficulties of
implementing a housing loans policy throughout the
country. The progress of the programme was also
disturbed by the slowness of the community payments.
At the time of the Court’s audit certain NGOs in the
network had been obliged to suspend the activities
associated with the programme pending the disbursement
of funds.
69. The start and execution of the micro-projects
programme financed jointly with the Microprojects
Programme Trust in 1995 (12,6 Mio ECU) were also
disrupted by the excessive length of time required for the
Commission to sign the financing agreement and disburse
the funds. As of March 1997 68 micro-projects had been
approved, but the level of progress was very low. The
project managers had been obliged to make use of
overdraft facilities pending the Commission payment, so
as not to hold up execution of the financed measures.
Weaknesses in the tools and procedures for establishing
the EPRD
70. Weaknesses in the tools and procedures used by the
Commission were the root cause of the substantial delays
that were noted at every stage of EPRD implementation
and also had a negative impact on execution of the
programmes.
Payment delays
71. Most of the projects visited by the Court had been
affected by the endemic slowness of payments: in the
view of those concerned the Commission was the slowest
of the donors. These delays were essentially due to the
excessive time taken by the Commission to approve
interim reports and updated work plans. Where the
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partners may experience serious financial difficulties. In
the case of the Micro-project and Urban Sector Network
programmes the managers were obliged to resort to
overdraft facilities in order to avoid suspending project
activities.
Exchange losses
72. For several NGOs the amounts received in ZAR
were, in general, lower than the amounts due under the
terms of the contracts, where amounts are specified in
ecus. Analysis of some twelve project payments showed
that these differences were the result of a private South
African bank applying extremely unfavourable exchange
rates (19). On a total of 10,8 Mio ECU of disbursements,
the equivalent of 74,9 Mio ZAR at the INFORECU rate,
the NGOs received only 72,8 Mio ZAR after conversion
at the bank’s own rate. The difference of 2,1 Mio ZAR is
the equivalent of 0,4 Mio ECU at the INFORECU rate,
3,7 % of the total disbursal. In some cases the difference
was as much as 7 %. Comparative analysis of some of
the payments for government projects showed that the
rates applied by the Reserve Bank were much more
favourable. Since these are very significant amounts for
the NGOs, the Commission should examine the
possibility of adopting alternative procedures, so that
NGOs receive the amount specified in the contracts (20).
Financing agreements
73. Poor drafting in the financing agreements (NGO and
government) also disrupted the start and execution of the
EPRD. The clauses covering, inter alia, payments, reports
and project accounts appear in various parts of the
agreements and in many cases lack both clarity and
consistency. The inconsistency is particularly great in the
case of the December 1994 financing agreements, which,
although they apply to direct funding of NGOs, included
the contract clauses used under the old Channels system.
The wording of the financing agreements was not
properly checked and material errors were not detected
(19) There being no real demand for the ECU in South Africa, the
banks are able to set their own exchange rate, which may
differ considerably from the rates quoted on the international
money markets.
(20) Payment by the Commission in ZAR would make it possible
to minimise these losses and the possibility is not excluded
by the Financial Regulation.
during the approval procedure (21). The financing
agreements concluded with the NGOs in 1995 and 1996
only provided for payment of advances of 80 % of the
annual budgets and did not cover the procedures to be
observed for payment of the year’s balance of 20 %. The
Court identified at least two payments of balances, for a
total of 746 171 ECU (22), which had been effected
without the Commission’s having identified the omission,
and suggested amending the agreements in question.
74. On none of the projects reviewed by the Court had
the NGOs provided the bank guarantees required by the
financing agreements. The South African banks refuse to
give such guarantees for NGOs, because the latter do not
have the requisite level of own funds. Instead of bringing
the terms of the agreements into line with reality, the
Commission asked a bank to issue ‘certificates’ which
were in no wise equivalent to guarantees.
75. As for the projects adopted during the two phases of
the Special programme, partners are required by the
terms of the financing agreements to convert the month’s
project expenditure into ecu by means of the monthly
rates published in the Official Journal of the European
Communities  (paragraph 32). This provision is
inappropriate and was not followed for any of the
projects audited. The Commission should modify these
contract conditions with something that is practical and
appropriate.
76. The Delegation certainly tried very hard to make up
for the drafting weaknesses of the contracts, but it was
unable to remedy all the shortcomings. The texts of
financing agreements have improved significantly since
October 1996, but effort is still required in order to
rationalise the provisions of the contracts and, in
particular, to resolve the difficulties to which the
payment procedures are prone.
77. Major amendments of financing agreements were
adopted by the Delegation during meetings with the
partners or were authorised by means of a simple
exchange of notes (23), without any formal amendment of
(21)  For example, the Parliamentary Support Programme
(AFS/1996/9) stipulates in the body of the financing
agreement that the Ministry of Finance represents the
Republic of South Africa, even though the agreement was
signed by the Speaker of the Parliament.
(22)  Projects Urban Sector Network (94/75070/060) and
Micro-project Programme Trust (95/75070/005).
(23)  See, for example, the projects Participatory Primary Health
Care Programme, the Urban Sector Network, the
Microprojects Trust and the Land and Agricultural Policy
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the text of the agreement. Brussels headquarters, too,
often ratified amendments without formally amending
the text of the agreement.
78. The Court has already highlighted weaknesses in the
procedures for amending provisions of financing
agreements, in some of its earlier reports (24). This
situation is indicative of weakness in the Commission’s
control system and is mainly due to the lack of clear
instructions regarding the procedure to be followed and,
in particular, the division of responsibilities to be
observed as between Brussels headquarters and the
delegations.
Tendering procedures
79. The Community rules and procedures that apply to
project procurement and tendering are different from
those applicable to central and local administrations
under South African law. A major difficulty is that the
South African rules give preference to South African
firms, and particularly to those from ‘previously
disadvantaged communities’, whereas Community rules
require open tendering for European Community
companies and, under certain conditions, also for other
third countries. This was a source of difficulties among
the government projects which the Court audited on the
spot and, in the particular case of the National HIV
AIDS programme, it led to considerable delays and
severely disrupted the execution of the programme. There
were also problems with the implementation of the
Parliamentary Support Programme.
Technical assistance
80. EU funded technical assistance is both well perceived
and remains an important component of the overall EU
aid programme to South Africa. Nevertheless, it is a high
cost resource, particularly where expatriate technical
assistants are recruited from Europe. At present the
Government Departments receiving such assistance
remain largely unaware of its cost because it is not
financed directly from project funds.
(24)  See paragraphs 15.27 — 15.31 of the Court of Auditors’
Annual report concerning the financial year 1991 (OJ C 330,
15.12.1992) and Special Report No 1/98 in respect of
bilateral financial and technical cooperation with
non-Member Mediterranean Countries (OJ C 98,
31.3.1998).
81. In South Africa there is a significant amount of
skilled expertise available in many fields and there is
considerable scope to recruit technical assistance locally,
applying local terms and conditions which are more
cost-effective than those for European technical
assistance. In general terms, the Commission should first
determine whether, for particular assignments, local
expertise is available and appropriate for the task and,
only where it is not, turn to the recruitment of expatriate
technical assistance.
82. The precise duties and responsibilities of EU
financed technical assistants seconded to work in various
Government Departments have not been sufficiently
defined by the Commission, especially as regards their
responsibilities towards the Delegation and the
Government Departments.
83. In the case of a Government Health Project the
intended role and function of a technical assistant to
develop and implement a management accounting system,
was diverted for 14 months to that of coordinator, with
the result that the original objective had not been
achieved at the time of the audit. Also, for a period of
nearly 3 months, this technical assistant acted in a senior
line management role within the Health Department,
without the agreement of the Commission.
84. Technical assistance has not always been provided at
the right time. Normally, the contract time period of
technical assistance should be in line with the project
timetable. In the case of the Land Reform Project, for
example, the administrator provided for under a technical
support programme was only appointed 12 months after
the signing of the Financing Agreement. The South
African authorities had to start the project without his
assistance.
85. More attention needs to be paid to ensuring that
sufficient technical assistance is provided at a local level,
and not only at central level. For example, regional
beneficiaries involved in the Land Reform Project would
have obtained easier direct access to advice, instead of
having to route their queries through elaborate committee
processes.
COMMISSION ORGANISATION AND RESOURCES
86. This report has emphasised in several instances the
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scheme; it combines high political relevance,
administration complexity, volume of funds and diversity
of actions.
87. All these factors called for high quality organisation
and reinforced management resources, which were not,
however, provided. Firstly, between 1986 and 1991, the
Commission could not set up a structure on the spot for
the administration of the scheme. In 1991 the Programme
Coordination Office was opened, but only with limited
technical responsibility. It was not until 1994 that the
Commission established in Pretoria a full Delegation.
88. Secondly, the Commission failed to give enough
priority to the management of the South African aid
programme: insufficient management resources were
allocated, there were inadequate written procedural
instructions and the organisation set up was inadequate.
At Commission headquarters in Brussels, the South
African Unit has been insufficiently staffed, with frequent
staff movements and gaps in posts.
89. In South Africa, the tasks and responsibilities of the
PCO, and the procedures that it was to follow, were not
clearly set out. This contributed to management
shortcomings and deficient monitoring.
90. Even when the Delegation was established in
Pretoria in early 1994, the Commission did not provide
sufficient staff for the duties involved. For more than one
year the Delegation consisted of the Head, his assistant
and a secretary; the Development Counsellor was not
appointed until 1995 and the posts in the staff
organigramme were not all filled until the end of 1996.
91. In addition, the lack of written instructions and
guidelines has led to shortcomings in the management
routines of the Delegation; inter alia:
(a) there is no clear division of responsibilities between
the staff of the Delegation, so that, for example, it is
not clear who is responsible for monitoring which
project;
(b) information systems are weak: project documentation
is not put together in a single file; in several instances
information has not been processed and various
reports and other documentation have been lost;
(c)  the monitoring system does not provide sufficient
information for assessing the current status of the
projects: actual disbursements; reporting deadlines;
progress made towards objectives, constraints
encountered, etc; under these circumstances it is not
possible to ensure adequate project monitoring,
supervision and continuity in the service.
92. A particular point that affects the organisation of
the Delegation in South Africa is the need to maintain a
presence in both Pretoria and Cape-Town, where the
National Parliament alternates meetings. The Delegation
has opened an office in Cape-Town where the Head is
frequently obliged to remain in order to deal with
political affairs. That has led to delays in the resolution
of important matters, especially affecting the development
cooperation. There is a need to nominate a Deputy Head
of Delegation in Pretoria responsible, in particular, for
development cooperation and project monitoring.
CO-ORDINATION IN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION
BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND MEMBER STATES
93. Article 130u of the Treaty on European Community
(TEC) stipulates that Community development
co-operation policy shall be complementary to the
policies pursued by the Member States. With this aim,
and seeking for coherence and effectiveness, Article 130.x
of the same treaty, requests the co-ordination and
consultation between Community and Member States.
Since 1993, the Council and the Commission have taken
significant steps in this direction: a pilot experience was
launched in six countries (25) and a series of resolutions
and conclusions were issued (26).
94. In South Africa, meaningful coordination should be
regarded as a major issue. Firstly, 14 of the 15 Member
States are represented in the country and face similar
problems; secondly, strong links and co-ordination,
which were developed during the earlier more difficult
political periods, are already in place.
(25) Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Mozambique
and Peru.
(26)  See notably the ones issued on 2.12.1993; 6.5.1994 and
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95. Council Regulation (EC) No 2259/96 of 22
November 1996 on development cooperation with South
Africa (27) regards coordination as a central instrument to
guarantee optimal effectiveness of the aid. The
Regulation invites the Commission to take all necessary
measures; these would involve the organization of regular
meetings, the establishment of a system for the exchange
of information and the transmission to the Member
States of a cooperation strategy paper and project
outlines. Finally, the Regulation extends the need for
coordination to other donors.
96. Current coordination mechanisms in South Africa
consist of regular meetings and of exchange of
information on the programmes implemented. These
mechanisms have permitted a significant involvement of
the Member States in the definition and inception of the
Community programmes. Documentation has been
regularly sent by the Commission to Member State
representatives and Community operations have been
discussed in detail. However, the exchange of
information regarding Member States’ actions has not
been formalised and little progress has been made on the
establishment of a common data base. Insufficient
information has hindered the achievement of a more
effective coordination.
97. To strengthen coordination, the Commission and
Member States should take practical steps to implement
the provisions laid down in the above-mentioned
Regulation:
(a)  setting out detailed procedures for consultation and
exchange of information and for the adoption of
common approaches; these procedures should ensure
that information flows in both directions between the
Community and the Member States, including meeting
schedules, compilation of a data base, transmission of
reports, and common appraisals;
(b)  defining and enhancing the role to be played by the
Commission Delegation; adequate resources must be
provided so that the Delegation can fulfil this role;
(27)  OJ L 306, 28.11.1996.
(c) developing common sectoral strategies; efforts should
be directed to improving the administrative capacity
of the South African government to deal with and
coordinate international donors;
(d)  extending coordination to other donors and adopting
a consistent approach, which should entail common
accounting and reporting requirements, agreed
disbursement schedules and joint auditing
procedures.
CONCLUSION
98. In September 1986 the European Community
decided to support actively organisations that were
providing assistance to the victims of apartheid, and to
contribute significantly to the efforts to secure a peaceful
transition to democracy. As such, it was a unique
programme, opposed by the South African Government,
and controversial in Europe. The Commission showed
considerable imagination and foresight in promoting the
programme. It was responsive to the needs of the target
population. The Special Programme is regarded by those
in South Africa who were involved with it as having
made a positive contribution during the period of
transition. As a result, the European Community built up
considerable political goodwill with the new democratic
leadership of South Africa (paragraphs 1 — 5 and 22).
99. The Community, therefore, was in a key position in
1994 to develop relations between South Africa and
Europe in the economic and cooperation spheres. It took
immediate steps to do so. Like other donors, however,
the Commission, in order to show without delay its
solidarity with and support for the new government,
approved through the EPRD more programmes spread
over a wider number of sectors than could be effectively
managed in the short term. The constraints on the
capacity of the Commission to handle such a portfolio of
actions and of the new government to absorb the funds
within the timescales foreseen were not sufficiently taken
into account. Nor was sufficient preliminary
ground-work done to identify what institutional
strengthening was necessary before projects could be
implemented effectively, and what role the Community
should play in assisting the South African authorities in
this regard (paragraphs 56 — 57). As a result, substantial
implementation delays were encountered in the
implementation of the EPRD. Similar problems have
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development cooperation, as PHARE (28) and the
Mediterranean (29).
100. Efficient and effective implementation of the
Community’s programmes of assistance to South Africa
has throughout the whole period from 1986 to 1997
been adversely affected by the inadequate procedures,
systems and resources applied by the Commission:
(a) initially, the Commission sought to apply ‘light and
flexible’ procedures, but without defining what these
consisted of and setting out clearly to the partners
what would be acceptable (paragraph 4);
(b)  as the situation improved and it was possible to
operate in a more open way, the opportunity to
establish appropriate procedures and systems was not
taken. Although the administration of the projects
was entrusted to the Channels, the Commission, in an
attempt to ensure strict control, retained in the
central services the authority for the approval of each
individual project, contract and contract amendment,
report, and payment. Since the Commission failed to
provide sufficient resources to carry out and check
properly and promptly all these operations, the
approach followed was unworkable and failed to
provide adequate management and control;
(c) the specific exercise to close the 750 open projects
with NGOs and CBOs, going back to 1986, was
poorly designed and implemented, so that the limited
resources available were used inefficiently (paragraphs
45 — 52);
(d) as far as the EPRD is concerned, the chronic problem
of insufficient resources to manage a programme of
its size and diversity has been made worse by the lack
of operating instructions for staff in the delegation
and in Brussels, and staff movements (paragraphs 87
— 92);
(28)  See paragraphs 2.4 — 2.12 of the Special Report No 3/97
concerning the decentralised system for the implementation
of the PHARE programme (period 1990-1995) OJ C175,
9.6.1997.
(29)  See paragraphs 150-151 of the Special Report No 1/98 in
respect of bilateral financial and technical cooperation with
non Member Mediterranean Countries.
(e) implementation efficiency has been adversely affected
by the slowness of Commission payment procedures,
shortcomings in financing agreements and the failure
to agree on the tendering procedures to be applied.
101. Many of the shortcomings highlighted in this
report are similar to those set out in Court reports
concerning other external actions, for example the Special
Reports on the PHARE programme (30), on the
MED-Programmes (31), and observations concerning
NGO cofinancing (32). The Commission should, without
delay, take steps to overcome these weaknesses.
102. The Commission should seek, therefore, in the area
of development cooperation generally, to establish a more
effective decentralised management approach that not
only places decision making authority at the most
appropriate level of the system, but also strengthens
ownership on the part of the beneficiary organisations
and encourages a greater degree of partnership. Within
its own organisation, a degree of operational and
financial responsibility should be decentralised away from
central services to the field, where decisions can be taken
closer to the actions concerned. Such an approach should
also aim to utilise the limited resources of the
Commission for managing and controlling the use of
Community funds in an optimal manner. Such an
approach would require:
(a) establishing a clear framework and terms of reference
for the operation and financial implementation of the
programmes, including precise and straightforward
reporting requirements;
(b) determining what decisions are best taken at the level
of implementing organisations, the Delegation, and
the central services in Brussels, and what are the
pre-conditions in terms of capacity and resources for
such a decision making structure;
(c) as one of the above pre-conditions, being able to rely
on the management and control systems of the
implementing organisations: to achieve this, the
Commission needs to assess existing systems and
provide support for their improvement;
(30)  Special Report No 3/97 concerning the decentralised system
for the implementation of the PHARE programme (period
1990-95) (OJ C 175, 9.6.1997).
(31)  Special Report 1/96 (OJ C 240, 19.8.1996).
(32)  Annual Report concerning the financial year 1990 (OJ C
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(d)  focusing monitoring on the overall execution and
results of the programmes, complemented by selected
checks of individual actions.
103. The EPRD forms one part only of the relations
between the EU and South Africa. The negotiation of a
Trade and Cooperation Agreement which will establish,
after a transitional period, a free trade area (33) with the
Community is a matter of great importance for South
Africa. The volume of development aid from the
Commission to South Africa is considerable — South
Africa benefits from one of the largest single country
financial and technical cooperation programmes with the
Community. However, the economic and social progress
of the country depends to a greater extent on the
successful development of efficient producers able to
compete in international markets in the many sectors
(natural resources, agriculture) in which it has a
comparative advantage. The trade negotiations are long
and complex, and were not completed at the end of
1997. In this context, it is important to ensure that
European commercial policy is coherent with
development strategy.
104. Member States have very keen interest in and have
been closely involved in the trade negotiations. It is
disappointing to note, however, that, in the context of a
new financial and technical cooperation programme with
a new government, coordination between the
Commission and the Member States is limited. They have
had a significant input into the definition of the
Community programmes, but there has been a lack of
information provided by Member States on their actions.
This limits the possibilities to define a coherent European
Union programme of assistance. Further, greater efforts
are needed, not only between the European Union donors
but also with other donors, to agree common approaches
on procedural and accountability requirements.
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 27 and 28
May 1998.
For the Court of Auditors
Bernhard FRIEDMANN
President
(33)  Subject to a number of protocols protecting certain key
sectors from tariff-free imports of products from the
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ANNEX
BURSARY PROGRAMME
Programme objectives and description
1. The objective of the Bursary Programme was to assist higher education students from disadvantaged
communities and to contribute to the establishment of a national bursary scheme. It provided bursaries
consisting of a grant (60 %) and of a loan (40 %) to be repaid by the students to the Tertiary Education
Fund of South Africa (TEFSA). Other components of the Programme targeted the improvement of
administration and student support services of historical black Tertiary Institutions (TI) (1). Between
1993-1995 the EC allocated to the Programme 59,9 Mio ECU, of which 45,5 Mio ECU has been disbursed.
Around 34 000 bursaries were granted.
2. The Programme was managed by the Kagiso Trust (KT), which established a Bursary Office for its
administration. The bursaries were disbursed through the TI to which the Office advanced funds according
to the amounts awarded to each student. At the end of the exercise, the TI forwarded to the Office an audit
report stating the amounts of the grants and the loans provided by beneficiary, the actual figure expended
and the remaining amount to be refunded.
3. A Bursary Programme Committee was set up to establish policy criteria and to oversee the
administration of the programme. The Committee consisted of representatives of the TI, the Ministry of
Education, TEFSA, KT and the EC Delegation.
Control system
4. The financial control of the programme chiefly relied on the submission by the TI of audit reports.
However, this mechanism did not function satisfactorily:
(a) deadlines for the submission of the audit reports were not established and a penalty clause in case of
non-submission was not foreseen;
(b) until 1995 the Bursary Office did not request from the TI the reports due for 1992, 1993 and 1994;
(c) comprehensive instructions were not given to the auditors; the reports were not consistent and in most
cases did not meet the control objectives. In several cases, the auditors themselves did not consider the
exercise as an audit in the strict sense, in some cases the scope of the work was restricted, in some only
qualified opinions were formulated or none at all;
(d) there was a lack of follow-up of the reports by the Bursary Office. Unacceptable reports were not
rejected (for example those issued by the TI’s own internal auditors) and those containing a qualified
opinion or containing observations were not cleared up.
5. No other control mechanisms were operated. The Bursary Office did not carry out annual
reconciliations between Commission, KT and TI accounts to establish the balance of funds available. As a
result, around 11 Mio ECU (18 % of the funds available) remained unused (2).
6. One particular weak element in the control system was the absence of an audit review of the Bursary
Programme as a whole, which was not provided for in the contract concluded between the Commission and
KT.
(1)  Tertiary Institutions are universities; technikons; and teacher training, technical and vocational colleges.
(2)  This amount corresponds to 10,67 Mio ECU of Community commitments not disbursed to KT and approximately 0,5
Mio ECU in funds unexpended in the TI’s accounts.C 241/112 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
Programme supervision
7. The poor functioning of the control system was made worse by the lack of effective supervision. Firstly,
the Bursary Office did not review the procedures and systems of each TI.
8. Secondly, the Bursary Committee did not function properly and did not follow up matters of a financial
nature. The Committee held fewer meetings than foreseen, there was inadequate segregation of duties (the
secretary of the Committee, was, at the same time, the director and financial manager of the Bursary Office)
and data examined mixed up projections and actual figures.
9. Thirdly, neither KT main office nor the Commission supervised the work performed by the Bursary
Office. Until the end of 1996 they were not aware of the absence of reliable figures on expenditure and of
the non-repayment of the loans by the students.
Evaluation
10. In 1994 a mid-term external evaluation of the Bursary Programme was conducted. The evaluation did
not assess financial management and did not tackle the loan repayment problem. The recommendation that
the financial overview role of the Bursary Committee should be strengthened was not followed up.
11. No final external evaluation of the Programme has been carried out nor is foreseen.
Achievement of objectives
12. The 1994 evaluation underlined the success in reaching the targeted group and concluded that the
Programme provided financial assistance to disadvantaged students and was contributing to the redress of
racial and gender imbalances. This conclusion was drawn in 1994 and needs to be further confirmed for the
period 1995-96.
13. In a number of respects, however, effectiveness, sustainability and visibility of the Programme have not
been satisfactorily achieved.
Effectiveness
14. Effectiveness was reduced as a consequence of poor financial management. As explained in paragraph
5, 11 Mio ECU remained unspent; this could have financed more than 8 700 additional bursaries.
15. Further, funds arrived very late in the school year to final beneficiaries. As a result, the TI and the
students were obliged to advance the expenditure, sometimes taking out private loans.
Sustainability
16. Sustainability of the Programme has not been ensured in that no priority was given to the repayment of
the loan component of the bursaries.
17. At the end of 1996, only 1,13 % of loans had been repaid; this represents a loss of more than 72 Mio
ZAR (approximately 12,5 Mio ECU at December 1996 exchange rates) for the national bursary scheme.
The feasibility of recovering the loans is dramatically decreasing with time; this undermines the
sustainability of the Programme and puts at risk the financial capacity of the national scheme.
(3)  The European Union/Kagiso Trust Bursary Programme, an evaluation. British Council. August 1994.C 241/113 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
Programme ownership
18. The beneficiary students did not receive an annual statement of account (loan granted, interest accrued,
etc.) to record and confirm their financial position. They were poorly informed on the mechanisms of the
scheme and were not involved at any stage in its administration. As far as the final beneficiaries are
concerned, there was a lack of programme ownership, which is a chief element for ensuring successful
development programmes.
Visibility
19. In most of the TIs visited by the Court, neither the TI’s staff nor the beneficiary students were aware
that the European Union was the source of the funds. KT did not make public the source of funding until
the end of 1996, when problems arose because the Programme came to an end. The Commission’s Financial
Controller pointed out the lack of visibility in 1995, but no steps were taken to redress it.
20. The Commission did not develop an information strategy (via brochures, press releases or other
actions) for the dissemination of the EC origin of the funds. Visibility is necessary to reinforce partnership
and the cooperation relationships both in South Africa and in Europe.C 241/114 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
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REPLIES OF THE COMMISSION
INTRODUCTION
The Court’s audit policy towards EC’s South Africa Aid
Programme
14. The Commission takes note of the global positive
assessment of the Court on its programmes in South
Africa in spite of the difficult conditions prevailing there
during the first two phases, and agrees that the basic
principles underlined by the Court are those which must
— and in fact do — form the guidelines for its activities.
In order to ensure financial control and accountability a
certain amount of procedural groundwork is required
which can create delays in implementation, given that our
development partners are not familiar with donor’s
requirements, or sometimes have a different
administrative approach.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUDGET
15 — 19. As regards the disbursement rate of payment
appropriations for the projects relating to the period
1986-1990 — a percentage of 85 % was achieved.
During the project closure exercise, unspent amounts
have been identified (up to 4.2 MECU) and are being
decommitted.
Concerning the commitments for projects launched
during 1991-1994 a disbursement rate of 70 % was
achieved. During this period large exchange gains
ECU/Rand occurred. This prevented liquidation of total
contract amounts in ECU. Due to lack of personnel it
was not always possible to close the projects and to
decommit rapidly.
As the Court rightly points out, and with the
introduction of the new European Programme for
Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) in 1995, it is
true that payment levels declined sharply. Between 1994
and 1996 the major unspent commitments were in
government projects for the years 1995-1996, when the
disbursement percentage commitments/payments reached
only 29 %. This is to a large extent due to the initial
expectation by South Africa that the EC funds could be
used to reimburse expenditure already incurred by the
implementing Departments or public bodies. The South
Africa administration realised only in a later stage that
their legislation did not allow a pre-financing of
Community projects by national funds, it subsequently
became apparent that the Departments were unable to
make initial payments to the projects. This held up the
execution of these projects for 12 to 18 months at least.
This problem was addressed in 1996, when it was
decided that the corresponding Financing Agreements
should be amended by riders to allow the payment of
advances on the basis of approved annual work plans. It
took five months for the South African Government to
sign the riders. In 1997, after adapting the Financial
Agreements it was possible to double the amount of
payments compared with the previous year.
Another reason for the low execution rate was the
change in government administration following
democratic elections bringing about major reorganisation
of the staff responsible for our programmes.
These delays could not be anticipated by the Commission
since their origin was within the competence of the South
Africa government.
There were also slow start-up times for large
programmes, which could not be fully anticipated at that
time for which partial solutions have now been found
(e. g. preparing tender dossiers and/or work plans before
the financing agreements are signed in order to be ready
to launch the programme immediately).
SYSTEM FOR IMPLEMENTING PROJECTS THROUGH
THE CHANNELS
Introduction
22. The changes in the way the Commission was
operating in South Africa from 1991 onwards led to
difficulties which were and are addressed. Shortage of
staff was often an obstacle to quick reactions. It has
always been a problem for the South Africa programme.
Staffing levels are gradually being increased, but this
takes time. The streamlining of administrative processes
(see responses to points 39 and 66) and aid delivery
mechanisms is also expected to have a positive effect on
the reported weaknesses. It is also considered that a more
focused programme with clear priorities in our
co-operation with the South African Government would
lead to a higher level of efficiency in development
achievements.C 241/116 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
Observations concerning the Channels system
Design weaknesses
25 — 26. After the period of ‘light and flexible’
management due to the particular circumstances in South
Africa — 1986-1991 — the Commission had to tighten
the management procedures for the next round of
development projects in South Africa. Unfortunately, as
mentioned above, the necessary human resources were
not rapidly available, causing delays in the day to day
execution of the programme.
27. The special difficulties of South Africa, and
especially the problems resulting from the Apartheid era,
encountered by the Commission and the learning process
in which it was engaged were quite different from other
programmes. In addition, it should be mentioned that the
Channels themselves are under constant change. The role
NGOs play in the development sphere is still a sensitive
matter in the South African political context. The
Commission has consistently sought to adapt itself to this
dynamic situation, the approach being to act as much as
possible through well equipped and well organised
intermediaries (such as Transitional National
Development Trust (TNDT) or INTERFUND) which
were identified via an appraisal study launched in 1997,
and which will have to be reinforced (capacity-building)
when necessary (see also point 66).
Formulation of projects
28. There was no delegation in South Africa at the time.
The Programme Co-ordination Office (PCO) did not
have enough staff with experience in project preparation.
In 1993/94, efforts in South Africa were concentrated on
the forthcoming elections, and it was difficult to train
partners at that time in project management. Project
proposals were thus by necessity often accepted in the
format in which they had been prepared, and were
indeed sometimes poorly formulated.
29 — 30. Project time frames were invariably too short,
failing to allow sufficient start-up time and even sufficient
time for implementation and reporting. Additional
information was often requested before agreeing to
extend time frames, but communication between the
Commission headquarters and individual projects, often
in remote areas, was not easy, and replies or
justifications, not always understood by the project
managers, often took months to be submitted. Extension
of contract deadlines, which places a considerable
administrative workload on all concerned, is a
requirement of budgetary discipline. The particular
exercise referred to in this paragraph was due to the lack
of human resources, which made it impossible to observe
all the deadlines during the budget year. And it must be
remembered that time frames were extended in order to
give the required budgetary cover, i.e. to keep the
commitment open, and to allow the project to report and
receive funds if these were due.
Financial and treasury management
31. The rather weak follow-up of the partners’ accounts
was, to a large extent the result of the extremely difficult
circumstances under which the programme started. As
the Court rightly points out, the programme started in
the face of severe active opposition from the South
African Government. In order not to put its partners in
danger, the Commission had to adapt management to the
reality of the situation. The fact that the Commission did
not immediately apply the strictest reporting and
follow-up requirements as from 1991 on is due to
various reasons. These range from a lack of resources to
the positive experience of partners’ financial management
during the previous years. This was recognised by the
evaluation team in their report on the European Special
Programme (ESP) (Oct. 96).
The Commission recognises that the monitoring of the
funds could be improved, certainly in relation to the
Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference (SACBC)
and South African Council of Churches (SACC). The
closure exercise in South Africa by the Technical assistant
(period: 1986 to 1991) has already helped the
Commission to identify unused funds which are being
recovered. The ongoing closure review by the audit firms
(period: 1991-1994) will allow the Commission a
detailed insight of the actual situation on outstanding
funds. To facilitate the recovery of these funds, the
Commission is considering opening an account in South
Africa to receive them.
32. As the Court rightly observes, the strict observance
of the conversion system was impractical. The Court’s
report relates to not amending contracts. It is true that
the Commission did not modify the contracts to fit the
practice at that time: this was not an ideal situation, but
given the priorities at that time and the pressures of
managing so many contracts with so few resources, this
issue was not addressed.
Payment and reporting
33-38. As far as reporting is concerned; a timeframe for
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table. Normally the reporting should have been done
during this timeframe (unless an extension had been
granted). However, the signature of the contract often
occurred much later than the indicated starting date of
the project. As the payment arrived only after that
signature the whole project, and consequently the
reporting, was delayed. Most projects only started after
the first payment had been received.
The reporting required by the Commission was not too
difficult for the beneficiaries. It required only a narrative
report (2 or 3 pages were acceptable) and a financial
report indicating — according to the budget in the
contract — what had been spent of the advances paid by
the Commission. Especially for the earlier projects the
Channels due to their requirements often rejected the
reports. As the projects were often located in remote
areas and the reports transferred via local offices to the
headquarters of the Channels, considerable time was lost
in this process.
The fact that decision-making was rather slow in the
Commission obliged the Channels to introduce requests
for continuation of a project well in time. This could give
the impression that the funding for the initial project and
the second or extension project were executed together.
Wherever possible the Commission took into account a
certain closing date for the first project — based on the
audit reports of the project -and only from that date
onwards the next project could start. With the large
number of ongoing projects it was not always possible to
track the different contracts for the same project in due
time.
34. During the first two phases the projects were for the
most part quite small.The system of linking reporting to
payments was appropriate for that type of project,
especially given the shortage of Commission staff
dedicated to South Africa. Of course, some projects did
not submit their reports, but they would have been even
less likely to do so without any financial incentive.
35. As reporting was linked to payments and to the time
frame of the project, as mentioned above, this did not
always correspond with the financial year. The projects
had not asked for this linkage. On a few occasions, new
funding agreements were signed before ongoing ones with
the same organisation, had been closed, but care was
always taken that there was no overlap of funding.
36. The Commission was always as flexible as possible,
within the constraints of the Financial Regulation, in the
knowledge that many of the projects had limited capacity
for reporting. Thus, the minimum required was that a
financial statement be prepared showing expenditure
against the budget lines in the contract, and that a short
narrative report should give information on the activities
carried out.
37. The Court observes that the last payment is often
outstanding. The current closure exercise will bring some
clarifications on this. Preliminary results indicate that any
overfunding was at the level of the Channels, which
could often be explained by exchange rate differences at
that time. The overfunding — or exchange gain — stayed
then with the Channel, until recovered by the
Commission.
However with the arrival of the democratic government
in 1994 there was a change in the approach to NGO’s
and also in the funding habits of donors who turned
more towards government led projects. The NGO’s
received less funding and often the projects closed before
all objectives were achieved thus not allowing them to
present the final report, a condition for the disbursement
of the last instalment. Hence the abandonment of the last
instalment.
The reporting on grants provided by other donors was
not explicitly indicated in the earlier projects and the
Commission services often had the impression that the
projects just tried to keep things going with the grants
that came in.
The Court rightly points out that the closure exercise
should give some insight as to why a certain number of
projects have not submitted a final report, or even in
some cases interim reports. In the Commission’s opinion
its reporting requirements can not considered to be
particularly cumbersome, even though the approval
circuit may seem for the projects to be rather lengthy.
38. Audited financial statements, while sometimes of
limited use regarding the precise use made of EU funds,
nevertheless give a good indication of the general
financial situation of the organisation and reveal
incidences of misuse of funds. In the particular case of
the Bursary Programme, because of the unsatisfactory
situation, the Commission took action in 1996 and it was
decided to stop funding the bursary programme through
Kagiso Trust (KT) and to fund ongoing students through
TEFSA (the Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa (see
Annex).
Project monitoring
39. The Commission is currently improving procedures
and has constituted a task force within the Delegation in
order research solutions to improving the information
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40. Thirteen of the fourteen projects referred to have all
expired and are marked for closure, except for one
project of SACC. Project time frames have been extended
in order to retain the possibility of further action if
required.
42. Delays were incurred, as stated by the Court;
however, they were not always caused in the way
described. It should in this context be noted that neither
with the channels, nor with the Programme
Co-ordination Office (P.C.O) was any expertise available
in financial matters relating to the Commission.
As far as the Bursary Programme is concerned, the
situation raised by the Court has now changed, since the
visit of Commission representatives to the project in
October 1996, when remedies were proposed and
accepted. In 1997 TEFSA has taken over the management
of the projects, remedied the situation and is beginning to
collect the back payments — see comments to point 38.
43. The initial management information system was
abandoned at the end of 1995, but a new tool was
introduced at the beginning of 1996, namely GELIBU
(Gestion des lignes budge ´taires) for South Africa. This
supplement to the information system used by the
Accounting Service SINCOM allows for tracking of the
project status, as well as providing all financial
information. It is correct that the Commission did not
have a copy of the contracts between the Channels and
the project holders, preferring for practical reasons at
that time to limit contractual relations to the Channels.
This system was modified in 1995.
44. The second wave of the project closure exercise is
now well under way and will address the problem of
outstanding balances. It should be noted that 4 MECU of
the 10 MECU outstanding can be attributed to one
project, Uthombo Pride (92-75070-397), which it has not
been possible to decommit because of on-going
protracted legal proceedings.
Closure of Contracts
47. Meetings were held in April 1996 in Pretoria and
July 1996 in Brussels where planning and responsibilities
were defined. A definitive format of the required
information to close the projects was decided in 1997.
48. In addition, the recruitment of the private sector
audit firms necessitated a restricted tender launched in
July 1996 with a deadline for submission of offers of 25
September 1996. Because the offers did not meet the
requirements, the tender was cancelled and the two
contracts were awarded by direct agreement.
45-52. The procedural difficulties the Commission
encountered during 1996 have been solved during the
second half of 1997 and the situation on the closure of
ESP projects as outlined in the Court’s report has
definitively improved. Inter service agreements have led to
a clear definition of responsibilities and tasks.
Computerised tools to overcome the shortcomings of
existing systems have been developed. This has allowed
the finalisation of closure dossiers of all projects of the
1986-1991 period, 415 in total. Of these, 125 projects
have already been closed, the remainder being in the final
stages of closure.
The second wave of closures (period: 1991-1994) is
ongoing with the assistance of two audit firms in South
Africa. Although there were delays in producing the
closure review reports by these firms, the Commission
still intends to respect its deadlines to close 180 projects
by the end of June and to close all non-active projects by
the end of 1998. In order to overcome the restricted
logistical means of the Delegation, measures are being
applied to reinforce its equipment and resources. To date,
32 projects have been closed, and 23 are in the final
stages. These projects have followed a ‘natural’ life cycle
and were proposed for closure after receipt of closure
reports, mainly from KT. These projects will still be
reviewed by the audit firms but will not need further
action assuming the auditor’s findings correspond with
the closure report of the partner.
THE EUROPEAN PROGRAMME FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT (EPRD) 1994-1996
The EPRD system
57. As mentioned in points 18 and 27, it was politically
and technically difficult to prejudge the implementing
capacities of the new Mandela administration. The
Commission also had to operate within the framework of
the 1994 co-operation agreement and the 1996 Council
Regulation. The latter determines the level of funds to be
allocated to South Africa and specified large sectors of
intervention. This opened the door to many requests
from various South Africa Departments. This issue has
been examined with the SA government and as a result a
Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) was agreed
upon with a concentration on basic social services
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budget-support mechanisms. Unfortunately most of the
departments involved in the sectors prioritised by the
MIP are facing major difficulties in the implementation of
the programme. Therefore, the Commission is now
seeking, in agreement with the NAO, to redirect its
activities towards large financial and managerial
capacity-building programmes in key departments and
towards sectors where the governmental partner has well
recognised and established implementing capacities, be it
at national or provincial level. In parallel, operations with
non-governmental partners will be reinforced.
60. b) In the case of the health programmes, the
combination of several NGOs was unsuccessful and
therefore that method of grouping was not repeated.
Experiences gained on earlier projects in the context of
organisational structures for co-ordinating activities have
been applied to new projects. Much attention is now paid
to the capacity of such organisations. New programmes
are always based upon either an appraisal study or, in the
case of an organisation with which the Commission has
already worked, an evaluation of the previous project.
61. The TNDT project started slowly, partly because
one major partner left, but is now a model for successful
implementation and monitoring. The Commission is
satisfied with the work carried out by this organisation.
Government projects
62. The three health programmes also started slowly.
These were in fact the first programmes funded through
the government. There was a natural learning curve.
Some problems occurred with tender procedures, but
much effort was put into making these programmes
work. At the present moment, the 3 projects have
reached a level of execution of over 90 % and are in a
final stage of implementation.
63. The project started very slowly. Now it is well under
way and a mid-term review is currently being
undertaken.
64. The aims were kept vague because the actual
situation under the new government was in itself not
clear (points 15 — 19, 27 and 57). The project therefore
needed to be designed for initial flexibility. A mid-term
review is currently being prepared for the Human Rights
Programme.
65. The initial cost of the programme was estimated at
36 MECU. The Commission has accepted to contribute
up to 16 MECU, the Swedish Co-operation up to 0.5
MECU on women and development, and the remaining
was to be provided by the South African Parliament
budget. The South African Parliament has decided that
their contribution would be done in a flexible and
gradual way. This explains why the first work plan was
based on the Commission’s contribution only. The
successful implementation of the part financed by the
Swedish government should also be noted, and
co-ordination meetings with the Commission are being
held. The staff have been appointed and the project is
being executed. External expertise was recruited recently
to help the project management to establish in detail the
objectives of the project and how to achieve them in the
most cost-effective way. The intention of the joint
funding will appear in the next work plan.
NGO projects
66. The Court rightly mentions the difficulties
encountered by NGOs in providing the Commission
services with information needed to justify the release of
funds and the delays, which resulted from this situation.
It was recognised that very often the NGO’s did not
realise that advice was available from the Delegation. The
Commission has taken a series of measures to improve
this situation:
— ‘Guidelines for the Implementation of EU funded
Projects in South Africa’ have been drawn up and
distributed in early 1998 to all partners (Government
services, NGOs, etc . . .). These provide clear and
operational guidance on inter alia how to elaborate a
financing proposal, a work plan, a tender dossier, on
payments and fund flows, reporting, etc. . . Seminars
are being organised to promote the use of the
Manual;
— A capacity-building programme targeted at NGOs
operating in the framework of the MIP, to be
implemented by a specialised NGO, is under
approval. It will provide immediate short-term
technical assistance and support to these NGOs when
needed; the setting-up of a specialised NGO
Programme Management Unit is also under appraisal
(project INTERFUND);
— The Commission is currently examining means to
bring about greater decentralisation of decision
making to the Delegation.
This set of measures should significantly improve the
implementation of programmes particularly with non
State partners.
68. The housing loan initiative was undertaken on a
province-by province basis. Secondly, the provision of
housing was the responsibility of Government, which, in
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regards the speed of implementation. Nevertheless, it has
to be stressed that, although in the first year only 879
houses could be delivered, there were over 1 800 in year
2, notwithstanding the absence of bridging funds.
Despite difficulties faced by certain NGOs, the overall
programme remained on schedule. Another component of
this programme was the servicing of sites (one of Urban
Sector Network’s principal responsibilities) with the
objective of a total of 7185 sites in the first year. The
project actually achieved a total of 7529.
69. Mention is made of the excessive time required for
the signature of the financing agreement and
disbursement of the first instalment to the Micro-projects
Programme Trust (MPT). This type of problem will be
minimised in future, as we are now encouraging the
projects where possible to prepare their tenders and/or
work plans prior to signature of the financing agreement,
so that everything is ready to start almost immediately
after signature.
Part of the problem is also to be related to MPT, which
did not provide the Commission’s services with the
required information. This was partly due to inadequate
communication between the Commission and the project,
which since then has been substantially improved.
Weaknesses in the tools and procedures for
implementation of the EPRD
70. As was explained in point 66, the Commission has
now a manual providing guidelines on every stage of
EPRD implementation.
Payment delays
71. In the two cases quoted, the Urban Sector Network
and the Micro-projects Programme, there were particular
problems with the work plans presented, which had to be
referred back to the projects. This added considerably to
the approval time. As regard the internal Commission
circuits concrete steps are currently in hand to
decentralise and simplify procedures in order to reduce
delays consistent with the principles of budgetary
discipline.
Exchange losses
72. Exchange rate fluctuations were a problem. In the
earlier years appreciation of the Rand meant that the
South Africans had substantial exchange gains. That is
why at a certain moment the Commission decided to
calculate the different payments in South African Rand
(ZAR) and to convert into ECU at the rate of the month
in which the payment was executed. With the
depreciation or appreciation of the ZAR the beneficiaries
receive more or less ZAR than intended. That is the
reason why final payments are now again made in ZAR,
despite the fact that the Commission would prefer to use
the ECU. The problem of rates applied by private banks
is a source of concern and is being discussed with the
government.
Financing agreement
73. The financing agreements have now been modified
to include very detailed and clear clauses relating to
payments. It is true that in one or two cases (one of
which was the Urban Sector Network) a pragmatic
solution was put forward as a basis for payment of the
20 % balance, as the text of the agreement was rather
unclear.
74. The system of bank guarantees for NGOs or the
‘certificates’ has been abandoned.
75. See reply to point 32.
77. For the last two years at least, riders have been
required for all significant amendments to financing
agreements.
78. This weakness was also identified by the
Commission and a clearer picture has been presented to
all parties involved in the recently released guidelines (see
also point.66). The amendment of financing agreements
is described in the financing chapter and indicates the
respective responsibilities and the ‘route’ that such
amendments should follow.
Tendering procedures
79. As early as in 1995, the European Commission and
its South African negotiating counterpart agreed to use a
slightly revised version of the standard EDF tendering
rules for the first financial packages of the EPRD, known
as the ‘Draft General Regulations’. The major difference
between the standard EDF tendering rules and the Draft
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Contract is precisely that in the latter no price-preference
is given to South African companies. Procurement for
community financed development projects in South
Africa has also been regulated by Council Regulation No
2259/96 of 22 November 1996, on development
co-operation with South Africa. Article 7 of this
Regulation requires that participation in invitations to
tender and contracts shall be open on equal terms to all
natural and legal persons in the Member States, South
Africa and the ACP-States and in duly substantiated
cases, other developing countries.
This also applies to the origin of the suppliers. Without
any changes to the existing agreement, the ACP-EC
Council of Ministers decided on 24 April 1997 the
accession of the Republic of South Africa to the Lome ´
Convention. Some issues and Articles regulated in the
Convention are not applicable to South Africa.
Concerning tendering rules, the decision confirms that no
price-preference shall be given to South African entities.
In its efforts to harmonise tendering rules, the European
Commission instructed its services on February 24, 1998
to apply uniform procurement thresholds for all budget
line activities. This decision implies that projects governed
by Financing Agreements signed after this decision, must
be implemented in accordance with the revised
thresholds, as agreed with Financial Control.
The issue of conflicting tender regulations arose on a case
by case basis, with some Departments being less flexible
than others in the choice of the procedure. The
Commission initiated discussions with the Government
and it was agreed (and stipulated in the Multiannual
Indicative programme signed in May 1997) that EC
tender regulations would apply for each new programme.
For older programmes, the same line is followed in
principle, but in some cases, South Africa is still facing
difficulties. This will certainly be solved with the
amendment of the Reconstruction and Development
Programme Fund Act which governs external public
donors funds. This Amendment will allow each donor to
use its own procedures, and should soon enter into
force.
Technical assistance
81. It may be true that skilled expertise is available in
South Africa, but often the projects need high level
Technical Assistants with experience in EU funded
projects. These can be recruited more cost-effectively
from Europe in a variety of cases. Nevertheless, the
Commission always very carefully examines the
possibility of recruiting local expertise prior to taking a
decision.
82. At the time of the visit of the Court, the
Commission had already organised an in-depth
consultation with the TA’s in order to develop precise
instructions on responsibilities and definition of tasks.
83. The lack of experience, both from the side of the
Department and of the expert, have resulted in the
situation described. The situation has since been
corrected.
85. The location of technical assistance (central,
provincial, local) and the decision taking process are
decided on the basis of appraisal studies and discussions
between the Government, beneficiaries and the
Commission.
COMMISSION ORGANISATION AND RESOURCES
86 — 88. See conclusion
89 — 90. The observations of the Court are fully shared
by the Commission, which is currently trying to find
solutions (see conclusion).
91. a) The Delegation is currently awaiting the
replacement of 2 senior staff members, and a provisional
distribution of tasks and responsibilities has been put in
place. In the light of the experience, grade and
background, of these new staff members, the new
organization chart will be finalised.
b and c) A distinction should be drawn between the
Special Programme (1986-1994) where close monitoring
was impossible, and the European programme for
Reconstruction and Development (EPRD 1995 onwards),
where monitoring is ensured through close contacts
between the delegation and the programmes. Certain
elements of the monitoring process could be further
developed. To this end, a task group has been created
within the Delegation (see point 39) and will propose
solutions in the near future. To the extent that funds can
be mobilised to implement the proposed solutions, this
should lead to a much improved situation.
92. The possibility of nominating a Deputy Head of
Delegation is currently under examination in the
Commission and will be taken into account in the
appointments of the staff referred to in the above
paragraph.
CO-ORDINATION IN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION
BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE MEMBER
STATES
95. The Commission is currently implementing the
Council Regulation in accordance with the views
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96. The observations address the Member States
activities. The Commission will handle this in the South
Africa Committee of the Council.
97. The Commission has and is taking proactive
measures to reinforce the co-ordination in Pretoria along
the lines mentioned by the Court.
CONCLUSION
98—104. As the Court has acknowledged, it was for
political reasons that the Commission was formally
represented in South Africa through its Delegation only
after 1994. It then entered into a process of continuous
support and technical adaptation to the complex and
changing circumstances of South Africa. This took place
in a context, both for the Commission and, in some cases
for the South Africa authorities, of scarce human
resources and budgetary constraints. Furthermore, the
conduct of the EU/SA negotiations for a long-term
contractual framework from June 1995 has imposed an
additional important burden on Commission services,
which could not foresee at that time that those
negotiations would be so complex and lengthy and which
in fact are still ongoing. Management resources were and
remain at a critical level and the Commission agrees with
the Court that this situation had an impact on
implementation efficiency. The Commission has not
however remained inactive and lessons have been learnt
from the difficulties experienced. On many occasions,
Headquarters and the Delegation have had a common
assessment of the problems they were facing. This has led
the Commission to simplify, rationalise and codify its
modus operandi (models exist for most standard
documents, a manual of procedures has been elaborated,
implementation problems are regularly reviewed and
discussed with the SA Government, new instruments such
as direct budget aid are being tested, etc.). At the same
time measures have been and are being taken to ensure
that the South Africa Unit and the Delegation are better
staffed.
The Commission is currently undertaking an exercise
with a view to bringing together the executive part of all
the external actions in one common service in order to
harmonise the execution and follow up of the external
aid programmes. The Commission is also engaged in a
process of decentralisation and simplification of its
co-operation. The case of South Africa is being duly
taken into account. At the same time, the Commission is
negotiating a Bilateral Agreement on Trade, Development
and Co-operation with South Africa, which will contain
provisions on development co-operation. It will also
prepare with the Member States a new Council
Regulation for the post-1999 era. In both cases, the
Commission intends to take advantage of these
opportunities to improve its relationship with South
Africa in terms of aid delivery, partnership, reliability and
decentralisation. The Court’s conclusions and
recommendations form an important contribution to that
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ANNEX
BURSARY PROGRAMME
It is true that, given insufficient human resources, the Commission relied too much on the KT Bursary
Office for the management of this programme and that this management proved to be inadequate. This was
realised in Brussels upon receipt of inadequate reports from KT. A mission from Brussels concentrated on
these problems, and decided towards the end of 1996 to cease funding students through KT and decided to
complete the funding foreseen through TEFSA. TEFSA has since verified and reconciled all KT data from
1992 to 1996. This reconciliation has enabled them to work more efficiently on the loan recovery
component of the agreement, although it is too early to produce statistics at the moment.
TEFSA’s loan recovery capacity improves annually and as they are confident of continued support from the
government, the sustainability of the programme will be ensured through them as it was envisaged in the
financing agreement.